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ignorance.I. Introduction
As a response to the slow progress of the GATT negotiations, the 1990s saw a
revival of regional integration attempts [see e.g. Bhagwati, 1993].• Especially
developing and newly emerging market, i.e. low income, economies hope that
regional integration offers a viable strategy for catching up with developed, i.e.
high income, economies. This is rather surprising in light of past experience.
Policies towards regional integration among developing countries were
implemented half-heartedly and often in an inconsistent fashion, were abolished
after a relatively short period of time, or were neutralised by new, mostly non-
tariff barriers [Langhammer, Hiemenz, 1990, pp. 18-60]. Member countries of
most so-called customs unions did never grant duty-free market access to each
other, and efforts towards trade liberalization were either limited to more or less
redundant tariff barriers or were aborted early. Even customs unions inherited
from the colonial past soon broke up after the member states gained
independence or disintegrated because new tariffs or non-tariff barriers were
erected.
It may be argued, however, that such an outcome is to be expected from regional
integration among low income countries, i.e. from South-South integration,
whereas regional integration with high income countries, i.e. North-South
integration, is a more viable strategy. In Europe, Greece and Portugal have
already been successful in joining the European Union (EU) and the newly
emerging market economies of Poland, Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia,
Romania, and Bulgaria are queuing up for entry into the rich country club
[Schmieding, 1992a]. On the other side of the Atlantic, the North American Free
Trade Area (NAFTA) has been established which includes Mexico
[Langhammer, 1992b] and sends first encouraging signals to Chile and
Argentina. However, the merits and flaws of regional integration, either South-
South or North-South, can only be assessed by comparing it with unilateral
integration, i.e. with opening up for the entire world market. This paper
evaluates the economic effects which low income countries could expect from
the three alternative strategies and tries to figure out possible advantages of
regional integration for catching up with high income countries.
The structure of the paper follows the literature [e.g. Balassa, 1962, p. 2] in
assuming that regionalJntegration isji jequence of four_steps: the integration of (
goods markets (Section II) and the deepening of integration by the integration of
factor markets (Section III.l.), monetary integration (Section III.2.), and fiscal
For an overview, see e.g. Hammes [1993] and Inotai [1991].integration (Section III.3.). Each section reviews the theoretical arguments and
shows the relevance of this arguments for low income economies. Section IV
gives a summary and policy conclusions.
II. Which Integration of Goods Markets: South-South, North-South, or
Unilateral?
Goods markets integration basically means to liberalize trade. Four types of
jiberalizing trade can be distinguished [Jovanovic, 1992, p. 9]:
Preferential tariff agreements, i.e. partner countries impose lower customs
duties on mutual trade than on trade with third countries;
Free trade areas, i.e. partner countries eliminate all tariffs and quantitative
restrictions on mutual trade with every country retaining its own tariff and
other regulations on trade with third countries;
Customs unions, i.e. partner countries agree on free trade with each other
and on a common external trade regime;
Unilateral liberalization, i.e. single countries reduce all trade barriers with
respect to all countries to the same extent.
The first three alternatives for trade liberalization listed above constitute regional
integration schemes, i.e. integration with partner countries. The following
concentrates on the customs union case when analyzing regional integration
because a customs union integrates preferential and free trade elements so that
the effects of preferential tariff agreements and free trade areas can be easily
derived.
2 Therefore, low inc.omeaCpjintnej.opting for the integration of their
goods markets have threejpajiicjjptionsj^
regional integration with other low income countries, i.e. South-South
integration;
regional integration with high income countries, i.e. North-South
integration;
world market integration, i.e. unilateral integration.
2 fa the following, a detailed analysis of all trade related measures is avoided in order to draw on
general arguments rather than on specific policies. The implicit assumption is that tariff
equivalents can be calculated for all trade related measures. To talk about tariffs exclusively seems
to be justified because there is a consensus in the literature that tariffs are superior to indirect
measures. Therefore, the first step of each trade reform, the transformation of non-tariff into tariff
barriers, is not debated here.The relevant question is which integration path a low income country should
choose. In economic terms, the answer should be based on differences in the
discounted benefits to be expected for all future periods. Hence, the dynamic
effects of integration should matter more than the short-run, static effects.
However, in politico-economic terms, the static effects gain importance because
these effects can be more easily related with the integration policy. Moreover,
governments can either be subject to the pressure of strong interest groups which
oppose liberalization or politicians and bureaucrats themselves may benefit from
trade restrictions through their stakes in inefficient public or private enterprises
or through their control over non-tariff and tariff barriers.
3 If negatively affected
in the short-run, the vested interests due to the subordination of government
decision under individual welfare considerations may inhibit liberalization.
Therefore, both static and dynamic effects of integration matter. While the static
effects address more the positive question if and which type of integration can
be established, the dynamic effects address more the normative question which
type of integration should be established.
1. Static Effects of Goods Markets Integration
The Vinerian customs union theory [Viner, 1950] exposes two static effects of
liberalizing intra-regional trade: partner countries imports replace domestic
production (trade creation) and partner countries imports replace imports from
non-partner countries (trade^diyersipn). Both effects emerge as a result of
liberalizing trade among~each other and from changing relative prices between
imports from partner and non-partner countries. 1
The necessary precondition for a customs union to have any effect is that market
driven integration between partner countries is to be expected in the absence of
trade barriers. Market driven integration, in turn, only occurs if the products of
partner countries are at least as cheap as domestic products and the products of
non-partner countries (including the external tariff). Whether or not this is the
case depends on transaction costs and on the competitiveness of partner
countries.
Transaction costs are determined by information costs, transport costs, and costs
due to expropriation and default risks [Amelung, 1991]:
See Langhammer, Hiemenz [1990, pp. 70-72] on this point and on its relevance for developing
countries.The processing of information facilitates an orderly decision-making
process on part of the trading partners [Bates, 1988]. Such processing is
facilitated by cultural, social, religious and ethnic affinities.
The protective effect of transport costs
4 tends to be lower for goods with a
rather high value added, low weight and small size, e.g. durable consumer
goods and capital goods [Langhammer, 1987]. By contrast, raw materials
and non-durables show a higher intensity of transport costs. Transport
costs between two countries can also be extremely high if the
infrastructure, i.e. railroad tracks, roads, and harbours, is not well
developed.
The equivalent of transport costs in capital transfers are the transfer fees
charged for the transfer of capital between -two countries. Given the
technical progress in the banking sector, distance has no impact on the level
of transfer costs. However, the costs of capital transfers depend on the
availability of an infrastructure providing market-making activities, i.e. a
modern banking sector and international communication networks
[Thiessen, 1988, Ch. 2].
The risks of expropriation and default also add to transaction costs. The
trading partners can engage in market-making activities that increase the
.reliability of transactions, and reduce the incentives for breaking contracts.
This is done through contractual arrangements which are much more
complicated than trade on the national level [North, 1987]. Most
importantly, impersonal exchange with third party enforcement requires
extensive legal cooperation between authorities of two countries. A
precondition for such a cooperation is a bilateral adjustment of law codes
and a willingness for political cooperation. Two substitutes for this
arrangement are possible. First, exporters can set up subsidiaries in foreign
countries and thus become multinationals that are legally treated as
domestic firms. This leads to an internalization of transaction costs
[Williamson, 1979]. Second, reliable banks can set up various document-
against-payment schemes. Trade can be expected to flourish when there are
4 The effect of this obstacle to trade on the direction of trade has been broadly discussed in the
literature on the customs union theory [e.g. Balassa, Stoutjesdijk, 1984; El-Agraa, 1988]. Earlier
works in location theory [e.g. Losch, 1954] have asserted that given increasing freight costs
markets may reach a maximum geographical extension, beyond which there is no demand for the
good because of prohibitive transport costs. Following Deardorff [1987], transport costs are natural
trade barriers in the sense that some goods and services may only be traded within delimited
regions thus being non-tradables outside the respective region, while other goods are traded
worldwide.well-developed international banking systems in the home countries of the
transactors. Such a financial system constitutes market-making activities
reducing transaction costs.
The determinants of transaction costs suggest that market driven integration is to
be expected in geographic regions [Lorenz, 1992]. Hence, regional integration ,
policies should be more effective than world wide integration. However, the \
determinants of transaction costs also suggest that the chances for market driven f
integration are significantly lower for South-South than for North-South j
integration. This is due to a high share of raw materials and non-durables in j
mutual trade, poor infrastructure and banking services, as well as restrictive j
regulations for foreign direct investment.
The effectiveness of South-South integration is further impaired by {
competitiveness considerations. Partner countries with a similar level of j
development and similar resource endowments have little scope for inter- j
industry specialization and partner countries with a relatively low level of j
development do not have the option of intra-industry specialization either |
[Langhammer, Hiemenz, 1990, p. 68]. Hence, both transaction costs and j
competitiveness arguments suggest that possible gains from South-South '
integration are significantly lower than from North-South or unilateral ;
integration.
Assuming that a country group could be identified which offers the opportunity
for gains from integration, the advantage of alternative strategies in terms of
efficiency depends on the effects on imports and exports respectively. On the
import side, a complete, unilateral liberalization is superior to all regional
integration strategies with respect to economic welfare, the difference being
equal to the trade diversion effect [Jovanovic, 1992, p. 20ff.; Hiemenz,
Langhammer, 1989]. Among the regional integration alternatives, welfare
effects are likely to be superior in North-South integration because North-South
integration allows for substantial gains from inter-industry specialization
whereas South-South integration is likely to maximize trade diversion by
impeding such specialization.
Unfortunately, the reverse order appears with respect to vested interests. A
complete, unilateral liberalization eliminates both fiscal revenue from taxing
imports and trade diversion effects. The former effect imposes a pressure on the
government to switch from international taxation which is important for low
income countries (Tanzi, 1990] to domestic taxation and limits the discretionary
power of politicians and bureaucrats. The latter effect forces the producers of
import-substitutes to improve efficiency or to switch to other products. Hence,unilateral liberalization is heavily opposed by the government and the producers,
of import-substituting goods7 - - —
According to the extended interest-group approach to the determinants of
protection in developing countries [Amelung, 1987; 1989], this is a rather
forceful coalition. First, the demand for protection is high because capital
owners reap high benefits if they invest in capital intensive production which
needs protection against products from high income countries. Second, the
demand for protection is easy to organize because capital is scarce and highly
concentrated, the capital owners living in the cities where they have good access
to the government. Third, the high demand for protection meets supply because
of vested interests on the side of the government. Hence, the resistance against
integration can be expected to be significantly lower for South-South integration
than for North-South or unilateral integration.
The opposition against an "import-biased" coalition has to come from exporters
because consumers are hardly to be organized. The position of exporters could
be strengthened by an increased access to foreign markets. This may give an
advantage to regional integration over unilateral integration. Staying outside a
closed trading bjoc,j,e. accustoms union with a high external tariff, can become
costly due to the trade diversion effect [de Melo et al., 1993, p. 175]". If relevanT
trading partners of a country which stays outside are in the customs union, the
possibility to increase trade with other (non-partner) countries does not
necessarily compensate for the decrease in trade with partner countries.
/ However, the trading bloc argument constitutes an advantage of North-South
rather than South-South integration over unilateral integration. It is reasonable to
assume that exporters in low income countries benefit more from market access
to high income countries' markets than from market access to other low income
countries' markets. The trading bloc argument also stresses the second best
character of regional integration. Only if trade barriers erected by a customs
union are significant it becomes worthwhile to join it both for politico-economic
and welfare considerations.
5
The discussion of static effects of goods markets integration suggests that
unilateral integration is clearly superior to regional integration in the
absence of trading blocs but suffers from the lack of access to foreign
On EU and NAFTA trade regimes and on effects on non-partner countries, see Gundlach [1993],
and Langhammer [1992a; 1992b; 1993]. It has to be acknowledged that part of the incentives to
join North-South integration also stem from income redistribution in favour of low income
members.markets and from the resistance of pressure groups interested in import
protection,
fiscal reforms may overcome political resistance by reducing the
importance of trade taxation and public ownership,
regional integration may overcome political resistance by providing market
access, and strengthening the position of exporters,
North-South integration is superior to South-South integration because of
lower transaction cost and higher gains from integration outweighing
political resistance.
All in all, South-South integration is hardly a viable option. The relevant choice
is between North-South and unilateral integration. The advantage of North-South
integration stems from protectionist attitudes of high income countries.
2. Dynamic Effects of Goods Markets Integration
From a purely economic point of view, possible gains from integration crucially
depend on the dynamics of integration. Static effects only set the starting
conditions which will provoke economic adjustment. Economic adjustment, in
turn, will affect possible gains from integration. There are basically two
categories of integration effects which can be expected to influence the gains
from integration in a dynamic perspective: market size and external effects. The
relevant question for low income countries is which integratiOTjjffeTsJffief largest
potential to reap dynamic gains, i.e. to catch up with high income countries.
a. Overall and Relative Market Size
A first argument in favour of dynamic gains from integration due to an increase
of the overall market size is related to impgrt.substitution. Chapter II. 1. gave the
positive explanation for import substitution to occur. However, import
substitution is always justified by normative arguments. Especially in
developing countries, industrialization via import substituting strategies figured
high on the policy agenda and provided a main argument in favour of South-
South integration [Bhagwati, 1993]. The basic argument is that, compared to
industrialization on a domestic basis, regional integration lowers the opportunity
costs of import substitution. When domestic markets prove to be too small to
allow efficient import substitution as the starting point of industrialization, the
formation of a regional market is seen as a way out of this impasse. In economic
terms, industrialization is seen as a rational social choice. Countries are willing
to bear the costs of income foregone by not importing from the cheapest
available source or by specializing in activities in which they do not havecomparative advantages. Given this social preference for industrialization
anything that lowers the costs of additional industrial capacity increases welfare
and contributes to economic development [Johnson, 1967, pp. 208-210]. The
larger the social preference and the potential for industrialization is, the less
important becomes the static Vinerian welfare-reducing effect of trade diversion
for countries entering a regional grouping.
However, a problem associated with regional integration is that opening the
domestic market to industrial imports from member countries entails a sacrifice
of domestic industrial capacity foregone [Langhammer, Hiemenz, 1990, pp. 6-
7]. Only if intra-union comparative advantages exist within the industrial sector
rather than between the industrial and non-industrial sectors, each partner may
gain compared to the alternative of national industrialization based on import
substitution. Otherwise, countries may see their social preferences violated even
if they would gain more in terms of income or expansion of nonindustrial
activities than they lose in the industrial sector. Additionally, the preference for
industrialization is a second-best objective and can, therefore, provoke
distributional conflicts among partners. As a result, the chances that regional
integration schemes help low income countries to develop their industrial base
via import substitution are rather low. More generally, export orientation has
been shown to be superior to import substitution as a development strategy.
Export orientation means that the system of incentives is neutral with respect to
sales in domestic or in world markets [Hiemenz, Langhammer, 1989, p. 106].
and not a selective elimination of tariffs as is
the case in a customs union.
6
A second class_pf arguments refers to efficiency and competition rather than to
protection [Emerson et al.,~ 1988, Part'D]. First, production becomes more
efficient, if there are economies of scale internal to a firm and a domestic market
which is too small to exploit these scale economies. Second, market integration
also increases the number of competitors. Hence, dynamic gains from market
integration are to be expected if domestic markets have been small enough to
establish natural monopolies or oligopolistic competition and if the integrated
market is large enough to establish a competitive market. Third, the Heckscher-
Ohlin model [Siebert, 1991a, pp. 53-78] predicts that gains from specialization
are high when relatively labour abundant countries become integrated with
relatively capital abundant countries. All three effects lead to a higher efficiency
An argument closely related to industrialization via import substitution is the training ground or
infant industry argument (see, e.g., Jaber [1970]). It suffers from the same drawbacks and fails to
give an answer why import substituting industries need more training than others.of_grciduction«.which implies a static short-run increase of income due to the
higher productivity of a given capital stock and a medium-run growth effect due
to the incentive to increase the capital stock because of the higher productivity
[see Baldwin, 1989].
Generally, small and labour abundant low income countries should be able to
reap substantial benefits from market integration with large and capital abundant
high income countries. In this case the increase in market size, competitors and
specialization is especially pronounced for the low income country. Therefore,
from the point of view of the low income countries, market integration with high
income countries seems to be a perfect development strategy and the chances to
catch up by South-South integration are rather bleak. As was the case with
respect to static effects, the optimal choice is between unilateral and North-
South integration and depends on market size. Again, North-South integration is
only optimal if significant barriers to market access exist in the case of unilateral
integration.
However, recent theoretical contributions to economic geography point out that
tiie honeymoon of North-South or unilateral "integration may at least be clouded
by relative market size effects. Models of economic geography [Krugman, 1991;
1992] predict the concentration of production in large countries. They assume
that a single homogenous agricultural product is produced with constant returns
to scale, while manufacturing is a composite of product varieties and involves
economies of scale, with a fixed cost for any variety produced at any given
location. Transportation costs of manufactured goods are assumed to increase
with distance. Workers move towards locations that offer higher real wages.
Though these extreme assumptions may be unrealistic, the driving forces
underlying models of economic geography are plausible. First, economies of
scale due to fixed costs of production provide an incentive to concentrate
production because of cost advantages. Second, concentration is less likely when
transaction costs are high, because increasing transaction costs tend to outweigh
the cost advantage of concentration. Hence, marketjntegration willjead to more
concentration because of the reduction of transaction costs by the elimination of
"internaf tariffs. Better forward and backward linkages then provide incentives for
manufacturing to locate near large rather than near small markets. As a
consequence, high income countries with larger markets would have an
advantage when market integration starts. The concentration of production
would even accentuate this advantage: larger markets would increase whereas
smaller markets would decrease.10
However, some qualifications are in order. First, empirical evidence does not
support a strong impact of internal economies of scale [see, e.g., Caballero,
Lyons, 1990]. Second, concentration decreases if product differentiation is
significant as is the case with intraindustry trade. Third, congestion costs may
outweigh concentration benefits. Fourth, that countries with small markets may
not have a comparative advantage in large scale production implies that they
should concentrate on small scale production in order to reap the dynamic gains
from integration. Fifth, concentration only occurs as long as economies of scale
could be exploited in a situation of oligopolistic competition. Increasing
competition in an integrated market forces producers to move down the average
cost curve to its minimum where average costs equal marginal costs, i.e.
economies of scale cease to exist [Baldwin, 1989].
All in all, market size is an argument in favour of either North-South or
unilateral integration which enlarge market size significantly and improve
competition most. To the contrary, distributional conflicts are to be expected in
the case of South-South integration motivated by import-substitution strategies.
Low income countries clearly gain most by joining large markets with low
external barriers and by specializing according to their comparative advantages.
In this case, catching-up rather than falling behind is to be expected.
b. Externalities of Physical and Human Capital
Assuming efficient specialization, recent models of endogenous growth point to
remaining chances and risks due to external effects of the accumulation of
physical and human capital. They show that convergence of income levels is not
necessarily the outcome of market integration. On the one hand, models with
increasing returns predict higher growth and convergence. On the other hand,
human capital models predict divergence [Tajoli, 1991; Stolpe, 1992].
Increasing returns external to the individual firm have been introduced in growth
models by Romer [1986]. Knowledge is accumulated by firms as an externality
of the process of capital accumulation, i.e. each firm's investment is a positive
externality for all the others. Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] show that market
integration leads to higher growth in.all participating countries. This result
occurs either because of externalities in the R & D sector and an increased flow
of ideas or because of increasing returns in the aggregate production function
due to R & D and an increased flow of goods allowing for a better exploitation
of ideas in a larger market.
In the specification of Grossman and Helpman [1991], innovation is driven by R
& D, an activity that firms pursue in order to develop differentiated intermediate11
goods. The production of intermediaries has increasing returns (internal to the
firm). When trade barriers decline due to market integration the usual neo-
classical result applies. Assuming that the low income countries import human
capital intensive goods, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that free trade
will lower the cost of human capital for this group of countries. If the costs of
human capital decrease, the costs of R & D decrease, the innovation rate
increases and so will the output growth rate. Because the opposite effect will
occur in high income countries, the convergence effects of market integration
will be strengthened.
In human capital models [Lucas, 1988], the input labour is substituted by
effective labour, i.e. the amount of work done per unit of time. The effective
labour can increase due to the accumulation of human capital defined as working
skills. If low income countries with a relatively low endowment with human
capital and high income countries with relatively high endowment with human
capital integrate, low income countries will specialize according to the
comparative advantage, i.e. in less human capital intensive sectors. If human
capital is accumulated by learning-by-doing, the effect of integration will be to
lower the growth rate in low income countries because production decreases in
sectors where human capital accumulation by training on the job is high.
An alternative specification of human capital models assumes that workers
acquire skills by devoting time to accumulate human capital, i.e. they go to
school. In this case, investment in education can change the comparative
advantage of a country. Assuming that human capital accumulation by learning
in school and by training on the job are complementary [Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp
et al., 1991, p. 53], investment in education constitutes a strategy for catching
up. It attracts production activities which are more human capital intensive,
creates positive externalities, and fosters economic growth.
Generally, converging and diverging forces may be accentuated by increased
trade due to the integration of goods markets and catching up requires to built up
human capital and to attract private investment. To the extent that human capital
and private physical capital accumulation need complementary public
investment, low income countries may face a problem. Their ability to invest
may be significantly constrained by the decline of trade taxation. Therefore, the
integration of goods markets increases the pressure for fiscal reforms especially
for low income countries. Trade taxation has to be substituted by other taxes,
e.g., by taxing consumers who benefit from the integration of goods markets.
Additionally, government expenditure has to concentrate on efficiency
enhancing public investment. If such fiscal reforms take place, low income12
countries integrating with high income countries improve their chances for
catching up; otherwise, they run the risk of falling further behind.
To sum up, the discussion of dynamic effects of integration suggests the
following conclusions:
- To cushion in South-South integration does not pay in a dynamic perspective.
Industrialization via import substitution is a misleading strategy and export
promotion suffers from - at best - modest increases in market size and
competition.
- Integration with high income countries is superior to South-South integration.
It contains the chance to catch up. This chance is superior in large, open
integration schemes. It can be improved by internal adjustment efforts with
respect to the specialization of production according to comparative
advantages and with respect to the structure of fiscal revenue and
expenditure.
- Given the willingness and the ability for internal reforms, the superiority of
either North-South or unilateral integration remains - as was the case for
static effects - an empirical question. Generally, low income countries are
well advised to go for the largest and the most competitive markets.
3. Relevance for Low Income Countries
Low gains from South-South integration explain why integration policies in such
schemes were implemented half-heartedly and often in an inconsistent fashion,
were abolished after a relatively short period of time, or were neutralized by
new, mostly non-tariff barriers [Langhammer, Hiemenz, 1990, p. 59].
One of the most telling examples in this respect is the Preferential Trade Area of
Eastern and Southern African States (PTA; see Langhammer et al., 1990]. The
target of the PTA was a free trade area which has never been achieved. Even the
implementation of effective trade preferences failed. Either preferences have
never been granted or countries have vetoed against a product to appear on the
"common list" of products for which preferences have to be granted.
Additionally, preferences have been differentiated according to stages of
production and local content and prohibitive non-tariff barriers have never been
reduced.
The failure of PTA is hardly surprising. First, it lacks a leading economy strong
enough to create gains from integration for the others. The most important
trading partners of PTA countries are industrialized countries. Even Kenya andBlblfofhok
Zimbabwe, though relatively advanced, are too weak
7 and South Africa's new
role has still to be defined. Second, the countries are stuck in import substitution
strategies and distributional conflicts. Third, transaction costs are often
prohibitive. This holds for the physical infrastructure as well as for the diffusion
of information and the institutional framework.
The case of Argentina's unilateral integration since the implementation of
economic reforms in April 1991 shows, that there is a viable alternative to
South-South integration. There are - at least - two remarkable aspects of the
Argentine reform [Schweickert, 1994a]. The starting conditions have been
extremely unfavourable: hyperinflation, unsustainable fiscal deficits, stagnating
or declining real income, low if any credibility of the government, and a de-facto
closed economy. Nevertheless, real and fiscal adjustment was radical and
allowed for a nearly complete opening of the economy: tariff barriers were
reduced, non-tariff barriers were eliminated, the currency became fully
convertible, domestic regulations were adjusted towards world market standards,
public-owned enterprises were privatized even in sensitive sectors, an
operational surplus of the fiscal budget was achieved by a tax reform, and
internal as well as external debt was consolidated and serviced.
Although unilateral integration seems to be sustainable without any preferential
market access, Argentina tries to enlarge its market. As a first step, Argentina
joined MERCOSUR, a regional integration scheme which allows preferential
access to the markets of Paraguay, Uruguay, and - most importantly - Brazil.
On paper, the ultimate aim of MERCOSUR is a customs union which, however,
is unlikely to emerge. Brazil seems to continue macroeconomic mismanagement
and protectionist regulations of goods and capital markets and Argentina will not
give up the gains from unilateral integration. Additionally, there are comments
by US officials that Argentina could be incorporated in NAFTA. In line with the
theoretical arguments on North-South vs. South-South integration, the Argentine
government reconsiders its trade policy because a close link to Brazil could
impede an eventual entry into NAFTA [EIU, 1993, No. 4, p. 22]. Because
NAFTA is a free trade area, Argentina could achieve a maximum market size
and competitive pressure by joining NAFTA and by maintaining unilateral
liberalization with all other countries.
The newly emerging market economies in Central and Eastern Europe had to
decide between unilateral integration and North-South integration in a customs
union. After having liberalized their economies at the beginning of the 1990s
Additionally, they are unwilling to open up their markets for the others.'14
[EBRD, 1993, p. 33ff.|, Poland, Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia, Romania,
and Bulgaria signed association agreements with the former EC. Therefore,
significant potential gains from unilateral integration will be lost for these
countries unless the EU lowers its external barriers.
The widening of the EU and of NAFTA will especially hurt low income
countries which are not offered access to these North-South integration schemes •
[Langhammer, 1992a; b]. There are three basic solutions to this problem. First,
from a normative point of view, GATT rules have to be changed [Nunnenkamp,
1993]. Either regional integration schemes will have to open up for all countries
independent of their geographical location or non-partner countries will have to
be compensated. Second, and also from a normative point of view, North-South
integration schemes should decline external trade barriers.
These two solutions, however, suffer from politico-economic constraints. At
least to a significant extent, regional integration schemes are motivated by
creating trade diversion, the gains from which should be distributed among
partner countries. Paying compensation and opening up regional integration
schemes eliminate such gains. It could be hardly assumed that, e.g., the EU
agrees to strip itself of its own attractiveness.
More promising than waiting for trading blocs to consider the welfare of non-
partner countries is to increase the pressure for market access. The example of
Argentina clearly demonstrates the superiority of the following sequencing:
unilateral liberalization first in order to increase the attractiveness as a trading
partner; negotiate for increased market access then; prefer free trade arrears to
customs unions. The strategy of a large number of low income countries seems
to be completely different. They try to sustain protectionism and negotiate for
preferential market access first. Due to the weak negotiating position, it is
rational that high income countries do not grant effective preferences. Hence,
these low income countries have to blame themselves in the first place for
forgiving the chances which integration offers. ^
III. Integration Deepening between Low and High Income Countries
The following analysis of integration deepening assumes that the arguments put
forward in Section II of this paper have excluded South-South integration as a
viable strategy. Hence, integration deepening has to be discussed in the context
of unilateral and North-South integration. With respect to the latter, the
discussion has to focus on the European case where a full-fledged integration
between high and low income countries seems to be possible. At least the
normative question is relevant whether or not newly emerging market economies15
as well as developing countries already included in the EU (Portugal and
Greece) should press for different pace and scope of European integration for
themselves. Another question to be asked is whether integration deepening
changes the relative advantages of unilateral and North-South integration
respectively.
/. Factor Markets Integration
Factor markets integration means the free flow of people and capital. With
respect to the former, the mobility of people between North and South is
generally seen as a problem because migration from South to North bears
significant social costs in all countries involved (for an overview, see, e.g.,
Siebert [1993a]). It can safely be assumed that the motivation of the EU and the
US to negotiate integration schemes with low income countries stems to a great
deal from the intention to reduce the incentives for immigration.
With respect to the mobility of capital, a closely integrated world capital market
already exists implying a high mobility of financial capital. But the free flow of
capital also includes the non-discriminatory treatment of production according to
ownership, i.e. the unrestricted allowance of foreign direct investment (fdi). It is
in this area where significant impediments to the flow of capital still exist (see
e.g. Agarwal et al. [1991], and Greenaway [1993]).
a. Stabilizing or Destabilizing?
The hesitation to encourage the flow of production factors may be motivated by
the fear that the real equilibrium becomes less stable or that it changes in favour
of more high income countries. This can be demonstrated by using Figure 1. It
shows the factor price frontiers - the transformation curves drawn in the factor
price space
8 - for a low income (FPFD) and a high income country (FPF,) (see
Siebert [1993b] p. 10 on the case of German unification). As before the low
income country is assumed to be small relative to the high income country.
Additionally, production is more efficient in the high income country. Free trade
equalizes relative factor prices, i.e. the low income country moves to GGBT and
the high income country to GGn. As can be seen in Figure 1, the absolute factor
prices are higher in the high income country due to the technological advantage.
If capital mobility is allowed, capital flows to the high income country, the low
income country moves along FPFD to GGBC and r] becomes the common
equilibrium real interest rate.
/is the real wage and r the real interest rate.16
Figure 1 - Market Integration and Factor Prices
FPFD
rI17




 a stable equilibrium. At GGK capital has become relatively
more expensive in the low income country. Free trade provides the incentive to
specialize in labour-intensive production which lowers the price of capital
relative to labour. A lower price of capital, however, implies that capital flows
out of the low income country. Free trade pulls the economy to GGDT and capital
mobility pulls the economy to GG^ leading to a permanent outflow of capital.
Capital flows in the 'wrong' direction, i.e. to the relatively capital abundant
country.
9
Second, the incentives to migrate are higher in the case of capital mobility. As
can be seen in Figure 1, the gap in real wages between the low and the high
income country has increased to /; - fc compared to /; - i'DT in the case of free
trade without capital mobility. Because migration sets in if differences in income
become sufficiently large, capital mobility might induce migration and a loss of
human capital. In the same way as free trade, labour mobility would pull the
economy back to GGDT. The result would be an outflow of labour and capital.
Third, if capital accumulation has external effects or human capital adds to an
economy's capital stock, the low income country would permanently lose
competitiveness. In Figure 1, FP%, shifts to the left and GGDC moves downwards.
The difference in real wages increases, the outflow of human capital increases,
I^ shifts further to the left and so on.
However, Figure 1 assumes that productivity is determined only by technology.
As discussed recently [Siebert, Koop, 1993; Sinn, 1993], institutional
competition can provide a countervailing force. First, it increases overall
efficiency because it allows countries to take measures according to their
individual preferences. Additionally, it enhances economic growth because
governments have to react to changes in their environment. This increases the
incentives to find better institutional arrangements and minimizes the cost of
finding the best institutional arrangement by letting the market decide [Hayek,
1968].
Second, from the low income country perspective, institutional competition
improves the chances to outweigh technological disadvantages. Diverging
institutional arrangements with respect to regulations (regarding health care,
social security, environmental protection etc.) produce different costs. However,
assuming that, e.g., environmental effects are country specific, different
regulations are an optimal solution if preferences for environmental protection
9 On this point, sec also Lucas [1990].18
are different [Siebert, 1991b]. The loss in competitiveness of countries with
stiffer environmental regulations is then the price to be paid for a higher
consumption of the environmental good. Most importantly, less stiff regulations
constitute a chance for low income countries to attract investment.
1
0 In terms of
Figure 1, institutional competition can shift FPFD to the right of FPF. leading to
capital inflows. If those inflows take place in the form of (non-discriminated)
fdi, the low income country could further improve its competitive position by
importing technology and by improving human capital due to learning on the
job.
Full capital mobility is a necessary and sufficient precondition for institutional
competition. Firms and investors have to be allowed to choose the best location
(see Sinn [1992]). The case for the mobility of people is less clearcut. It may be
argued that consumers and workers need an additional way of voting by feet in
order to force governments to work more efficiently [Brennan, Buchanan, 1980;
Hirschman, 1970]. But, contrary to investors and firms, they have the option to
vote in elections and with capital mobility the negative impact of inefficient
policies are more likely to show up immediately, i.e. before the next election.
This makes voting a more effective instrument to control governments. Hence,
mobility of people has limited potential gains. It has also significantly higher
(private and social) costs compared to capital flows.
Additionally, migration is not an efficient instrument to control governments
because of hysteresis effects.'
1 Hysteresis effects result from sunk costs and the
uncertainty related with the decision to move. As a consequence, large changes
in the economic conditions are necessary to induce migration and the reversal of
economic conditions does not necessarily reverse migration. Thus, migration is
not flexible enough to control government policies^ ""*"
The free flow of people may also overstrain tax reform capacity of low income
countries. On the one hand, capital as well as labour mobility limit the potential
for raising revenues because a mobile tax base can not be taxed [Siebert, Koop,
1993, p. 6]. On the other hand, funds have to be raised for public investment in a
physical and institutional infrastructure attractive for foreign investors.
Therefore, the tax base should be maintained as far as possible by allowing for
'0 Assuming that the income level is positively correlated to the preference for the environmental
good, this is an efficient solution.
1
1 See Siebert [1993b] on the economics of migration and Dixit [1992] on hysteresis effects.19
the elimination of trade and capital taxation
1
2 and by maintaining the possibility
of taxing people by limiting migration.
All in all, the integration of factor markets provides risks and chances for low
income countries. The risks depend on the ability to reform taxation and fiscal
spending. Therefore, migration should at least not be encouraged. The chances
depend on the possibility to attract foreign investors via institutional
competition.
b. Relevance for Low Income Countries
With respect to regional integration two different strategies can be identified. On
the one hand, Mexico removed restrictions on fdi in order to attract production
lines in NAFTA [Langhammer, 1992b]. On the other hand, the association
agreements between the EU and newly emerging market economies contain
significant grace periods for the dismantling of fdi regulations [Langhammer,
1992a], According to the above argumentation, the Mexican strategy is clearly
superior.
Most interestingly, the institutional competition argument tends to improve the
attractiveness of unilateral integration compared to North-South integration.
WhfleTiilT "Argenti is freelo iroe integtin effects b proiding "Argentina is freelo improve integration effects by providing
conditions for investment adequate to attract fdi and to encourage domestic
investment, countries integrating into the EU will have to adjust to common
regulations.
13 It is~*rea^onabTe~to assume that such a harmonization in the EU is
not a reflection of economic efficiency considerations but rather a reflection of
producers in high income countries demanding for a level playing field in order
to avoid institutional competition [Siebert, 1991]. Moreover, EU politicians and
bureaucrats tend to favour the harmonization of regulations because they derive
utility from the exercise of power related to the implementation of harmonized
regulations [Vaubel, 1991, 1992; Starbatty, 1993]. Clearly, any such
harmonization of regulations hurts low income countries in the first place and
reduces the advantage of North-South integration from their perspective.
The elimination of capital taxation does not imply that no price for public services is charged
which - of cause - has to be equal to its marginal benefit.
Tough the Casis-de-Dijon ruling allow for individual regulations, the Maastricht Treaty laid the
ground for a common industrial and social policy restricting institutional competition (see e.g.,
Laaser, Soltwedel et al. [1993] and Schmieding [1992a]).20
2. Monetary Integration
Monetary integration is an important issue both in unilateral and regional
integration. Unilateral monetary integration is complete in a currency board
regime where the exchange rate against an anchor currency is fixed, the
monetary base is fully covered by foreign exchange, and the Central Bank buys
and sells any amount of foreign exchange offered or demanded. The mechanics
of a currency board regime are exactly those of a monetary union, the highest
form of regional monetary integration. A country's money supply is determined
by the changes of the foreign reserve position. Hence, a currency board
simulates the situation of having a monetary union.
1
4
From the low income country perspective, the main argument in favour of
monetary integration with high income countries is to fight high and/or





idea is that a nominal anchor in the form of a fixed exchange rate should import
the anti-inflationary reputation of a stable currency by tying the hands of the
own monetary authorities. If discretionary policy is ruled out and monetary
policy is determined by the foreign Central Bank, the credibility of stabilization
would improve, private agents would adjust at once, and inflation would
decrease to and remain at the level of the stable currency. If valid, the credibility
argument would constitute a reason for low income countries to implement a
currency board with a fixed exchange rate against the currency of a stable high
income country or to join a monetary union with a stable high income country.
However, the following analysis shows that exchange rate based stabilization
needs rather than produces credibility. Moreover, if demanding preconditions are
not fulfilled monetary integration is likely even to endanger goods markets
integration, i.e. it distorts rather than deepens integration.
a. Stabilization vs. Real Adjustment
To see how a fixed exchange rate can stabilize an economy, assume that the
economy is in macroeconomic equilibrium and net capital flows are zero. The
1
4 The most important differences are, first, the physical existence of an own money in a currency
board regime which may give rise to currency speculation and, second, that a currency board has
no leverage with respect to the monetary policy of the foreign Central Bank.
15 Again, South-South integration can be ruled out as a viable option. First, developed countries have
- on average - a higher reputation for stability. Second, integration with developed countries saves
more transaction costs.
1(> Another one is the saving of transaction costs which is generally accepted [Willms, 1992. p. 189j
but not proved by empirical evidence, e.g., by a negative correlation between exchange rate
variability and the volume of trade [Krugman, 1989, p. 68].21
difference between domestic and foreign inflation is compensated for by
nominal devaluation so that the real exchange rate is constant, i.e. the real
exchange rate is in equilibrium but inflation is significantly higher than abroad.
If the exchange rate is fixed in such a situation, inflation decreases immediately
because the price increases for traded goods are curbed by world market
conditions. But ongoing inflation for non-traded goods will lead to an immediate
real appreciation.
Real appreciation creates an excess demand for traded goods and an excess
supply of non-traded goods. This is because traded goods become relatively
cheaper and demand shifts from non-traded to traded goods. Excess demand for
traded goods implies a trade deficit, an outflow of foreign reserves, and - with a
passive monetary policy - a monetary contraction.
1
7 As a consequence
absorption decreases, the demand for traded goods declines and the trade
imbalance is reduced. But the decrease in absorption further increases the excess
supply of non-traded goods. This exerts a pressure to reduce the prices of non-
traded goods. Domestic inflation must be even lower than abroad in order to
remove the real overvaluation and the excess supply of non-traded goods caused
by the initial real appreciation.
1
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A necessary precondition for private agents to adjust prices is that they expect
the monetary contraction to occur. If this is not the case, ongoing inflation,
growing real overvaluation, and increasing internal and external imbalances will
end the stabilization program soon. Therefore, the credibility of the monetary
contraction becomes a basic precondition for the flexibility of prices and for the
success of the exchange rate based stabilization.
1
9 Problems with its credibility




The need to finance the government budget may constrain the possibility of a
monetary contraction in low income countries because the collection of the
1
7 In the following, monetary contraction means a decreasing real money supply. Correspondingly,
decreasing domestic prices mean a lower difference between inflation at home and abroad.
18 In the absence of real shocks, the equilibrium of the real exchange rate remains constant and the
actual real exchange rate has to return to its initial level.
1' Contrary to a stabilization program with flexible exchange rates, the extent of the monetary
contraction is unknown at the beginning of the program. This makes the credibility of the
monetary contraction a challenging precondition in a fixed exchange rate regime.On the
advantages of stabilization with flexible exchange rates, see Schweickert [1993a; c].
20 Because only a currency board regime and a monetary union are considered, another relevant
macroeconomic constraint - foreign exchange reserves - could be neglected. On this point, see the
literature on balance-of-paymems crises summarized by Aghevli and Monliel [1991, pp. 229ff.].22
inflation tax and borrowing on thin domestic capital markets play a significant
role in financing government expenditure. Therefore, a monetary contraction
needs fiscal discipline,
2
1 i.e. expenditure has to be reduced and/or alternative
taxes have to be raised.
2
2 Otherwise growing pressure on the central bank to
increase the money supply would be expected by rational private agents. Hence
prices would not be adjusted.
If the monetary contraction is possible, the question arises, if it actually occurs.
The temporary fall in demand provides strong incentives for the authorities to
change the program and to avoid temporary unemployment via a monetary
expansion. This means that the announcement of a-fixed exchange rate is time-
inconsistent and private agents have an incentive not to adjust prices but to wait
for the policy switch.
2
3
In the case that private agents judge macroeconomic constraints not to be
relevant, monetary contraction is credible and guarantees a pressure to reduce
the prices of non-traded goods. If these prices are actually adjusted depends on
the price setting behaviour in the real sphere of the economy. The fall of non-
traded goods prices will not occur in the presence of indexation and inflationary
inertia [Edwards, 1993, pp. 5-10] and a low level of competition. In this case,
the monetary contraction will lead to higher unemployment rather than to a real
exchange rate adjustment.
The adjustment towards a new equilibrium becomes easier if the country is able
to attract capital inflows. Large capital inflows finance emerging trade deficits
and increase foreign exchange reserves. Hence, the money supply grows and the
prices for non-traded goods do not have to be adjusted downwards. However,
such an equilibrium may not be sustainable. First, capital inflows are of a
temporary nature at least to some extent. Second, the country may experience a
negative terms-of-trade shock. Third, if the exchange rate is fixed against a
21 Of course, the collection of the inflation tax could improve because of an increasing demand for
money. This implies that a monetary contraction, i.e. a decrease in real cash balances, does not
occur at all. However, the question addressed here is if a monetary contraction could be sustained.
2
2 This has not only implications for sustainability but for optimality as well. If the common or
dominating Central Bank has a zero inflation target, the inflation tax would be completely
eliminated. The literature on the optimal inflation tax (see, e.g., V6gh [1989] and Edwards,
Tabellini [1991]) shows that a positive inflation tax rate is efficient if the distortions imposed by
other taxes are considered and - especially relevant for developing countries - if the costs of
levying alternative taxes are high.
2
3 See Funke [1993] for an application of time-inconsistency arguments for reform strategies in
developing and Eastern European countries.23
single currency, e.g. the US$, an appreciation of the US$ against other relevant
currencies would imply a real appreciation for the domestic currency as well.
All these shocks have qualitatively the same implication for the economy. The
real exchange rate becomes overvalued, the trade deficit has to be financed by
an outflow of foreign exchange reserves, and the demand for non-traded goods
falls short of supply. This means that all the problems described above for the
case of stabilization without capital inflows emerge. Moreover, the problems are
even more pronounced due to the initial expansion. This is why the reversal of
capital flows typically marks the end of fixed exchange rate regimes. Monetary
contraction is not sustained and a devaluation crisis emerges [Guidotti, Vegh,
1992].
The chances to sustain a fixed exchange rate in-the face of an overvalued
exchange rate could be improved by complementary liberalization policies.
2
4
However, the conclusions are different for the liberalization of goods and capital
markets.
The most prominent issues in the liberalization of goods markets are trade
liberalization and privatization of state-owned enterprises. The arguments
against a simultaneous implementation of trade liberalization and macro-
economic reform claim that such a policy exceeds the capacity for real
adjustment. There are, however, strong arguments in favour of a simultaneous
implementation [Ize, 1990], First, the production of exports is encouraged by
lower prices for imported inputs reducing trade imbalances and the need for real
devaluation. Second, intensified competition raises the efficiency of domestic
production, allows to reduce prices, and, thus, speeds up real devaluation.
Hence, goods markets integration is an important precondition for the
sustainability of a fixed exchange rate. In the same vein, the privatization of
public-owned enterprises - especially if they belong to the non-traded goods
sector - makes prices more flexible and speeds up real exchange rate adjustment
if an appropriate regulation provides incentives for competition and enhances
efficiency in areas where competition is not possible.
With respect to capital flows, the problem is to measure the temperature of
capital flows [Dornbusch, 1983; McKinnon, 1984].
25 The flow of cold money,
i.e. long-term capital, is difficult to avoid in the case of capital outflows and is
2
4 See Edwards [1989] for an overview over the debate on the sequencing of macroeconomic reforms
and liberalization policies.
2^ It is important to distinguish this argument from the one made above for a full capital mobility
which has focused a growth perspectives rather than a macroeconomic stability.24
highly welcome in the case of capital inflows because it reduces the need for
real devaluation. The flow of hot money, i.e. speculative, short-term capital,
destabilizes real exchange rate adjustment. Therefore, exchange controls are




7 It can be expected
that private agents will adjust quicker to changes in relative prices if they regard
them as more stable. Moreover, a higher stability of real exchange rate
adjustment improves investment conditions and growth prospects [Rodrik, 1989,
p. 19] 28
Financial market regulations such as fixed nominal interest rates negatively
affect real exchange rate devaluation. A contraction of loanable funds may occur
leading to or expanding a demand surplus if interest rates are not allowed to rise
in order to mobilize private savings and to relax credit constraints [Corsepius,
1989; McKinnon, 1973, pp. 84 ff.]. By relaxing credit constraints, a
liberalization of domestic capital markets improves real adjustment to
overvaluation in two respects. First, efficiency enhancing investment in the
production of non-tradables eases the decline of prices for these products. Hence
a real devaluation will be quicker and temporary unemployment could be
avoided. Second, investment in the restructuring of domestic supply in favour of
tradable goods reduces the need for real devaluation.
The arguments on the appropriate sequencing of real exchange rate adjustment
and liberalization policies show that liberalization of goods markets, of the
domestic capital market, and of long-term capital flows can be expected to
improve rather than to overstrain the capacity for real adjustment. However, the
elimination of an independent monetary policy and the implementation of
liberalization policies may overstrain the capacity for fiscal adjustment. Trade
liberalization declines trade tax revenues; privatization declines the possibility
for implicit taxation via public enterprises; free capital flows exclude the
collection of the inflation tax via foreign exchange premia; the liberalization of
the domestic capital market increases the cost of borrowing. These effects stress
the need for fiscal reform in order to sustain fiscal control over the economy and
to improve the credibility of a fixed exchange rate.
2
6 The effects of speculation can be expected to differ according to the exchange rate regime adopted.
But both fixed and flexible exchange rate systems are vulnerable to destabilizing speculation.
27 it is of course possible to circumvent capital controls by overinvoicing of imports and underinvoi-
cing of exports. But the controls raise the costs and limit the extent of currency speculation.
28 Generally, overvaluation cannot be avoided or reduced by strict capital controls because it is due to
inconsistent domestic policies and distortions in capital and goods markets in the first place.
However, the relevant question here is whether or not free capital movements support the real
devaluation policy which tries to remove such inconsistencies.25
The following cgnclusions^can be drawn from the theoretical discussion of
exchange rate based stabilization and real devaluation:
- the preconditions for sustaining an exchange rate base stabilization are rather
demanding: the independence of monetary policy from macroeconomic
constraints - fiscal balance, unemployment - and a high flexibility of
domestic prices; '
- the liberalization of goods and capital markets - with the exception of short-
term capital flows - helps macroeconomic reform because it improves
adjustment capacity;
- fiscal reform is of utmost importance because fiscal constraints limit both the
flexibility of monetary policy and the liberalization of goods and capital
markets which help maroeconomic reform.
- if domestic prices and domestic supply responses to real shocks' are rather
sluggish - which can not be ruled out even under favourable circumstances -
a fixed exchange rate distorts relative price signals, the efficient allocation of
resources, and, hence, goods markets integration.
b. Relevance for Low Income Countries
The currency board type implemented in Argentina shows how successful
unilateral monetary integration can be [Schweickert, 1994a]. Starting with
hyperinflation in 1990, annual consumer price inflation came down to 5.2 per
cent at the end of March 1994. Capital flows changed their direction and
Argentina has received substantial net inflows since 1992. The monetary base
has more than tripled in real terms and market driven expansion led to high real
growth rates after years of stagnation or decline. This success is due to
outstanding adjustment efforts with respect to fiscal reforms and the
liberalization of goods and capital markets, i.e. Argentina's unilateral integration
into the world economy.
Argentina's success gives interesting conclusions for newly emerging market
economies for which exchange rate based stabilization has been proposed
recently [Bofinger, 1991; Schmieding, 1992b; Hofmann, Sell, 1993] and for low
income countries like Portugal and Greece which have a chance to join the
European Monetary Union (EMU). First, these countries should be able and
willing to put forward adjustment measures comparable to those in Argentina.
Second, if strong adjustment efforts are possible, the convergence indicators laid
down in the Maastricht Treaty for joining EMU make no sense. Argentina would
have met non of these indicators. Third, European developing countries willing26
to implement exchange rate based stabilization do not have to wait for EMU.
They can go for a currency board regime in the meanwhile.
However, the experience of Chile at the beginning of the 1980s clearly suggests
that at least in the medium-run a more flexible exchange rate is adequate
[Schweickert, 1994b]. The reason for the break-down of the fixed exchange rate
in Chile was that the implications of the debt crisis required a huge real
devaluation. Real devaluation would have required a monetary contraction large
enough to squeeze inflation significantly below the US level which might have
implied a disinflationary process. A situation which was not sustainable and
provoked a balance-of-payments crisis even though Chile has undergone a fiscal
reform and a deregulation of the economy comparable to that in Argentina in the
1990s. In the same vein, Portugal - among other countries - had to devalue its
exchange rate during the recent turmoil in the EMS because the (implicitly)
fixed exchange rate against the DM induced reserve outflows. The reason was
the strong demand for DM due to German unification effects and the following
speculative waves. But even without this additional shocks, the EMS showed an
increasing divergence in real exchange rates between the North and the South
because of a rather slow convergence of price levels. It could be assumed that
this divergence in competitiveness would have led to some realignment anyway
[Danthine et al., 1991, p. 44-46]. Moreover, if compared to the US, asymmetric
shocks in Europe are arguably larger and likely to grow rather than to shrink
with deeper and wider European integration in goods and factor markets [de la
Dehesa, Krugman, 1992, p. 48].
Chile's and Portugal's experience show that low income countries are well
advised to allow for flexible exchange rates if significant asymmetric real shock
can not be ruled out. At least, they should preserve their chance to opt out from a
fixed exchange rate regime in order to avoid unemployment and external
imbalance. Such a chance is given in unilateral monetary integration but not in a
monetary union.
3. Fiscal Integration
Fiscal integration is an issue which is only relevant for low income countries
which have an option to become full members of the EU. Proponents of fiscal
integration argue in favour of redistribution schemes, coordination in specific
areas, and the harmonization of government activities. If valid, an advantage of
regional integration over unilateral integration would be established. However,
the arguments in favour of fiscal integration are not too convincing. It can be
argued that fiscal cooperation rather than fiscal integration is adequate from the27
low income country perspective. Fiscal coopertion, in turn, gives no advantage
to regional integration and is even independent of other integration policies.
a. Redistribution, Coordination, Harmonization, or Cooperation?
Arguments in favour of regional redistribution and coordination of fiscal policies
stem from problems arising because of integration in money, factor, and goods
markets. With a single money in a monetary union, each country's monetary
policy is no longer autonomous but depends on the monetary policy of the
common Central Bank and on the balance-of-payment situation, i.e. on reserve
flows. This excludes the possibility of having an individual monetary
stabilization policy in line with a country's preferences or of balancing
asymmetric shocks by adjusting the money supply [von Hagen, 1991, p. 14].
Therefore, one branch of the theory of optimum currency union argues (e.g.
Kenen [1969] that a currency union requires an automatic redistribution scheme
between participating countries in order to balance country specific shocks. If
shocks are temporary, a counter-cyclical fiscal policy is possible with deficit
spending. Automatic redistribution between countries is not required. If shocks
are permanent, real adjustment is necessary and redistribution gives an incentive
to delay adjustment due to moral hazard effects. Moreover, redistribution can
even increase the impact of asymmetric shocks [Vaubel, 1988, p. 238]. Assume
that redistribution is tied to income changes and that both trade and capital flows
are balanced. If income decreases in one country because of a worsening of the
terms of trade, import demand decrease and a trade surplus may be realized. At
the same time, the redistribution induces a net capital inflow which requires a
trade deficit. The need for real exchange rate adjustment increases relative to a
situation without redistribution. From the low income country perspective, it
remains open to question whether or not inter-country redistribution for
stabilization purposes compensate for the disadvantages of one money described
in the last section or if it rather aggravates adjustment problems.
2
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With an integrated factor market two problems may arise: over-borrowing and a
restriction of income redistribution policies in a country. The over-borrowing
argument assumes the union's financial markets to be inefficient and isolated
from world capital markets arid/or the union's Central Bank to accommodate
fiscal deficits [Willms, 1992, p. 221ff.; van Hagen, 1991, p. 28ff.j. It argues in
favour of a coordinated fiscal policy via ceilings on the countries' fiscal deficits.
Additionally, Fratianni and von Hagen [1993] argue that, for the case of the EU, fiscal
centralization raise the likelihood that fiscal policy will be used as a tool for union-wide
discretionary macroeconomic policy limiting the credibility of any actions taken by the European
Central Bank.28
But such ceilings are neither necessary nor sufficient to control fiscal spending.
They are not necessary because the financial market needs not to be isolated and
the union's Central Bank needs not to accommodate fiscal deficits. The first best
solution is to open up financial markets and to make the Central Bank
independent. Moreover, monetary unification eliminates the exchange rate risk.
This strengthens the link between risk premia and the borrower's individual risk
and improves the efficiency of financial markets. Additionally, if voters and
investors are mobile, the penalties for imprudent public borrowing become high.
Ceilings on public borrowing are also not sufficient to control borrowing
because they lead to an increase of off-balance sheet operations [von Hagen,
Fratianni, 1991, pp. 244ff.] making a control of the budget even more difficult.
For low income countries, ceilings on public borrowing are highly inefficient
because this group of countries depends on external funds to finance investment.
Therefore, it would be rather important for them to relax credit constraints.
Without doubt, factor mobility limits the possibility to redistribute income from
one factor of production to the other and within factors. But factor mobility does
not necessarily- imply the collapse of national redistribution schemes and the
need for a centralized income redistribution scheme [Sinn, 1992, p. 192f.].
Redistribution becomes only limited to the extent justified by workers' and
investors' preferences if the free rider problem could be solved. If exit and entry
is free for the net taxpayer and the welfare recipients, it is indeed inevitable that
the former will emigrate and that the latter will immigrate. The first best solution
is not, however, to centralize redistribution or to restrict mobility, but rather to
untie the link between the freedom to move to preferred locations and the
freedom to leave and to join redistribution schemes without costs. If exit and
entry fees have to be paid, the free-rider problem is solved and redistribution
becomes an instrument of institutional competition. This has important
implications for low income countries in an economic union. The preference for
income redistribution can be assumed to be positively correlated with income so
that low income countries have a low preference for redistribution relative to
high income countries. By lowering costs for investors or high-skilled workers
due to low redistribution payments, the low income country could attract
investment and human capital and improve its competitive strength (see Section
m.l.). In other words, a common inter-personal redistribution policy would
especially hurt low income countries.
3
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3uThis holds also if redistribution is financed by developed countries. In this case the fiscal
implication could be neutral, but the allocation effect remains.29
To the contrary, low income countries participating in an integration scheme
with high income countries may ask for inter-country redistribution from rich
countries to poor countries because they face the need to compete while the use
of tax instruments is restricted. As argued above, the integration of goods and
factor markets makes catching up possible if low income countries succeed to
compensate disadvantages due to small market size and low endowment with
human and physical capital by providing favourable conditions for investors.
Such an institutional competition includes the regulatory framework and public
investment. At the same time, market integration and monetary integration limits
or prohibits the use of tax instruments which are more important for low income
than for high income countries. However, not redistribution but capital market
integration should be of first priority in such a situation because it is sufficient to
provide the financial funds for investment and it avoids moral hazard effects
which are connected with redistribution schemes.
Another set of arguments in favour of the harmonization of government
activities stem from the optimal provision of public goods in a region rather than
from the completion of integration policies. However, the degree of tax
harmonization should be as low as possible to allow low income countries to
find an adequate tax structure to finance productivity enhancing public
investment. Under competitive pressure, this might either lead to an ex-post
harmonization of taxes or to a diverse structure of national tax systems
[Eichengreen, 1990, pp. 154ff.]. In each case, a low level of ex-ante
harmonization of taxes establishes a permanent pressure for reforming
inadequate tax structures and, at the same time, maintains the possibility to
attract productive activities by providing an attractive institutional environment.
The theory of fiscal federalism provides a guideline for deciding on a minimum
of harmonization of government activity. The theory of fiscal federalism
[Buchanan, 1950; Oates, 1972; Olson, 1969] focuses on the optimal provision of
public goods by an optimal allocation of fiscal responsibilities between a central
government and regional jurisdictions. Applied to the regional integration
problem, the countries participating in integration constitute the regional
jurisdictions, and the ex-ante harmonization of the activities of national
governments constitutes the central government.
The theory of fiscal federalism establishes two principles: subsidiarity and fiscal
equivalence. Subsidiarity means that the regional jurisdictions should decide on
the supply of a regional public goods because they can adjust supply to regional
demand. If preferences for public goods, and, hence, demand differs between
regions, harmonizing supply would be inefficient and the population in regions30
with a lower preference becomes a "forced rider" [Stehn, 1993, p. 35]. Fiscal
equivalence means that the geographical incidence of financing the public good
should coincide with the jurisdiction supplying and consuming the public good
in order to exclude "free riders" [von Hagen, 1991, p. 4]. Spill-over effects and
economies of scale in the production of a public good constitute a case for a
general harmonization only if preferences and spillovers are homogenous for all
regions and all public goods. In the more general case of heterogeneous
preferences and spill-overs, the optimal solution is functional federalism
[Straubhaar, 1993], i.e. different cooperation schemes between countries for
different public goods.
b. Relevance for Low Income Countries
The present strategy of European integration is not favourable from the low
income country perspective. To the contrary, the interventionist provision of the
Maastricht Treaty, the harmonization approach to the completion of the single
market, and the general strengthening of the common redistributive policies
significantly impair the chances of actual and especially of would-be low
income members in Central and Eastern Europe [Schmieding, 1992]. More
specifically, the treaty endows the EU with interventionist competencies with
respect to social, industrial, and technology policy as well as in such areas as
consumer protection, the environment, health and education. Therefore, the
general idea is to provide a level playing field, rather than to stimulate
institutional competition.
Apart from the disadvantages for low income countries most of these policies
lag either an economic rational at all or are hardly to be identified as supra-
national policy areas according to the theory of fiscal federalism [Stehn, 1993].
Additionally, the subsidiary principle established in the Maastricht Treaty does
not provide a safeguard against overcentralization because it is open to
interpretation by EU bodies [Schmieding, 1992, p. 17f.]. Fiscal integration of
this type clearly strengthens the relative advantage of unilateral integration for
low income countries because this type of integration allows for an individual
institutional setting and the chance to cooperate with either developed or low
income countries in specific areas.
Cooperation even provides a starting point for a promotion of South-South
integration [Langhammer, Hiemenz, 1990, p. 74f.]. Common interests can be
found in the dealing with actual or perceived external threats or in the joint
production of public goods which would be too costly for individual countries.
Human resource development, food security, expansion of research especially in31
agriculture, energy management, environment problems, international
marketing, and improved flows of information and communication represent
severe bottlenecks to economic development, particularly in the poorer countries
of Africa and Central America, which could be widened by intraregional
cooperation. This type of cooperation will, however, be very selective and
country-specific.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
The paper has evaluated possible advantages of regional integration strategies j
for the low income developing and newly emerging market economies which j
aim at catching up with high income countries. Using unilateral integration as a ,
yardstick, theory has shown and experience has confirmed that there is no \J
advantage of regional integration strategies in this respect - except for second -
best arguments and specific circumstances.
South-South integration, i.e. regional integration among low income countries,
can be ruled out as a viable strategy at all. The basic reasons are that the internal
market which is created is too small, trade diversion is maximized, and the
redistribution of the zero or negative sum game becomes the major concern of
participants. As a consequence, South-South integration never reached the stage
of effective goods markets integration.
The systematic failure of South-South integration gives a first explanation for
the increased attempts of low income countries to join a rich country club. This
is to be observed on both sides of the Atlantic. In America, Mexico entered
NAFTA and other Latin American countries are keen to follow, hi Europe, the
newly emerging market economies hoping to shorten their transition period
demand for entry in the EU.
However, the attractiveness of North-South integration, i.e. regional integration
between high and low income countries, stems from significant external barriers
of such schemes and, generally, from the slow progress of GATT negotiations.
Hence, market access by unilateral integration is constrained and the optimal
choice between North-South and unilateral integration becomes an empirical
question. The arguments presented in the paper clearly show that low income
countries are well advised to go for the larger and more competitive market.
Even if North-South integration improves market access relative to unilateral
integration, integration deepening may limit potential gains for low income
countries. Especially the EU aims at integration deepening by harmonizing
monetary and fiscal policy. This tendency to provide a level playing field rather32
than to motivate institutional competition has been clearly shown to reduce the
advantages of North-South integration for participating low income countries.
The basic reason is that institutional competition is an effective instrument for
these countries to compensate initial disadvantages with respect to technology
and the human and physical capitaTstock.Therefore, low income countries are
well advised not to participate in integration deepening via harmonization. This,
however, constitutes a problem for the process of European integration.
Integration widening and - European style - integration deepening are clearly
inconsistent [see also Schmieding, 1992a].
|The second best character of North-South integration suggests that the search for
Ian optimum integration area (see e.g. Cooper [1986] and Tichy [1992]) is a
©misleading advice. If distortions like trade barriers and restrictions on
institutional competition are removed, the optimum area for the integration of
goods and factor markets is_clearly the^ workL..There are two strategies to come
closer to such a desired world. The first is to change the rules of the game and to
allow only for open regionalism in a GATT framework (see, e.g., Nunnenkamp
[1993]) where each country irrespective of its location will have to be accepted
as a member by a regional grouping if it accepts to rules of the grouping. It is to
be expected that this will induce competition among regional groupings for the
best institutional framework in terms of economic development. The second
strategy is to follow the example of Asian and more recently Latin American
countries like Chile, Argentina, and Mexico and to become important partners
for high income countries in trade negotiations by becoming important trading
partners first, i.e. by clearcut unilateral liberalization strategies.
Two final remarks are in order which qualify potential advantages of integration
with high income countries. First, the trend towards North-South integration
drives a wedge between those low income countries which enjoy the scarce
good of neighbouring high income countries offering market access and those
which will become more and more isolated. The latter are those who suffer most
from both slow progress of GATT negotiations and the emergence of North-
South trading blocs.
Second, integration with high income countries - either regional or unilateral -
is not a honeymoon scenario for low income countries but implies demanding
preconditions if it should initiate a process of catching up. Most importantly, low
income countries have to concentrate on production according to their
comparative advantages and they have to reorganize fiscal revenue and
expenditure in favour of domestic rather than external taxation and in favour of
investment in adequate physical, institutional, and human infrastructure.33
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